Abstract. The stack-based access control mechanism plays a fundamental role in the security architecture of Java and Microsoft CLR (common language runtime). It is enforced at runtime by inspecting methods in the current call stack for granted permissions before the program performs safety-critical operations. Although stack inspection is well studied, there is relatively little work on automated generation of access control policies, and most existing work on inferring security policies assume the permissions to be checked at stack inspection points are known beforehand. Practiced approaches to generating access control policies are still manually done by developers based on domain-specific knowledges and trial-and-error testing. In this paper, we present a systematic approach to automated generation of access control policies for Java programs that necessarily ensure the program to pass stack inspection. The techniques are abstract interpretation based context-sensitive static program analyses. Our analysis models the program by combining a context-sensitive call graph with a dependency graph. We are hereby able to precisely identify permission requirements at stack inspection points, which are usually ignored in previous study.
Introduction
Access control is often the first step to protect safety-critical systems. In modern Web platforms, such as Java-centric web applications or Microsoft .NET framework, applications comprise components from different origins with diverse levels of trust. A stack-based access control mechanism is employed in an attempt to prevent untrusted codes from accessing protected resources. Access control policies are expressed in terms of permissions (e.g., a permission can be "writing the file C:/students grades.txt") that are granted to codes grouped by different domains (e.g., www.jaist.ac.jp/faculty). Developers can set checkpoints through the Java API CheckPermission(Permission) in their programs, and access control is enforced dynamically at runtime by stack inspection. When stack inspection is triggered, the current call stack will be inspected in a top-down manner, and methods in the call stack are checked for granted permission. A caller can be marked as privileged, and stack inspection stops at such a caller. If all callers have the specified permission until a privileged method is found, access control is passed and stack inspection returns quietly, otherwise the program execution will be interrupted immediately.
Example 1 (Semantics of Java Stack Inspection). Consider the code snippet in Fig. 1 that we borrow from [6] and modify it to make checkpoints of stack inspections explicitly called and to make the analysis scenario more complicated.
There are two library classes Lib, Priv, and two application classes Faculty and Student. At the beginning of program execution, Java VM assigns all classes hereby methods in them to a set of permissions specified by a security policy. At runtime, the two clients will require to connect to their corresponding domains by creating a socket (Line 30 and 36, respectively). Such a request will trigger stack inspection at Line 6 by the API AccessController.checkPermission(Permission) which takes a single parameter of type Permission or its subclasses. Student is required to posses the permission perm s : "SocketPermission(jaist.ac.jp/student:8080,connect)
′′
and Faculty is required to hold the permission perm f : "SocketPermission(jaist.ac.jp/faculty:8080, connect) ′′ .
Moreover, the socket construction process should be logged in C:/log.txt by the system for later observation. A file access permission perm a :"FilePermission (C:/log.txt, write)" is required on the system to perform this task, hereby another stack inspection is triggered at Line 24. Note that Student and Faculty reside on the current call stack but should not posses perm a . To avoid authorization failures while logging, Lib invokes the API doPrivileged (Line 8) from the class AccessController with passing an instance op of Priv, and by Java semantics, op.run() will be executed with full permissions granted to its caller, and stack inspection stops at checkConnect without requiring perm a from clients of Lib.
Although stack inspection is well studied, there is relatively little work on automated generation of access control policies, and most existing work on inferring security policies assume the permissions to be checked at stack inspection points are known beforehand. Practiced approaches to generating access control policies are still manually done by developers based on domain-specific knowledges and trial-and-error testing. Since testing cannot cover all program runtime behaviors, the application could malfunction due to accidental authorization failures given a misconfigured policy. If a security policy is too conservative, i.e., some codes are granted more permissions than necessary, it violates the PLP (Principle of Least Privilege), and the codes become vulnerable points for malicious attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, the only existing analysis that attempted to automatically identify authorization requirements and generate access control policies for Java applications is [6] . As shown in Example 1, reasoning permissions demands points-to analysis for identifying objects of Permission type, and string analysis for resolving string parameters of relevant security APIs. As declaimed in their paper, they are the first to combine access rights analysis with stringanalysis for deriving a precise security policy. The analysis consists in a contextsensitive library analysis and a context-insensitive library-client analysis, being tailored for effectively analysing production-level programs. It is not studied how to resemble analysis results seamlessly in access rights analysis.
In this work, we present a systematic approach to automated generation of access control policy for the given program that necessarily ensure it to pass stack private s t a t i c f i n a l S t r i n g d i r = "C: " ; 3 private s t a t i c f i n a l S t r i n g domain= "JAIST .AC. JP" ; 4 public s t a t i c void check Connect ( S t r i n g host , i n t p o r t )
throws E x c e p t i o n {
5
S o c k e t P e r m i s s i o n p1 = mkSocketPerm ( host , p o r t ) ;
6
A c c e s s C o n t r o l l e r . c h e c k P e r m i s s i o n ( p1 ) ; 
}
10 public s t a t i c P e r m i s s i o n mkSocketPerm ( S t r i n g host , i n t p o r t ) throws E x c e p t i o n {
11
S t r i n g hn = h o s t +" : "+p o r t ;
12
S o c k e t P e r m i s s i o n p2 = new S o c k e t P e r m i s s i o n ( hn , " c o n n e c t " ) ; The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews conditional weighted pushdown systems. Section 3 defines an abstraction interpretation of program calling contexts. Section 5 presents permission generation. Section 6 formalizes the problem of access control policy generation. Section 7 gives realization algorithms as model checking problems on conditional weighted pushdown systems. Section 8 discusses how to lift existing analysis to fit the analysis framework. Section 9 discusses related work, and Section 10 concludes the paper.
Conditional Weighted Pushdown Systems
A pushdown system is a variant of pushdown automata without input alphabet. Definition 1. A pushdown system P is (P, Γ, ∆, p 0 , γ 0 ), where P is a finite set of control locations, Γ is a finite stack alphabet, ∆ ⊆ P × Γ × P × Γ * is a finite set of transitions, p 0 ∈ P is the initial control location, and γ 0 ∈ Γ is the initial stack content. A transition (p, γ, q, ω) ∈ ∆ is written as p, γ ֒→ q, ω . A configuration is a pair q, ω with q ∈ P and ω ∈ Γ * . A set of configurations C is regular if {ω | p, ω ∈ C} is regular. A relation ⇒ on configurations is defined, such that p, γω ′ ⇒ q, ωω ′ for each ω ′ ∈ Γ * if p, γ ֒→ q, ω , and the reflective and transitive closure of ⇒ is denoted by ⇒ * .
A pushdown system can be normalized by a pushdown system for which |ω| ≤ 2 for each transition rule p, γ ֒→ q, ω [16] . We omit p 0 and γ 0 when they do not apply.
Let σ = [r 0 , ..., r k ] with r i ∈ ∆ for 0 ≤ i ≤ k be a sequence of pushdown transition rules. A value associated with σ is defined by
′ ∈ P × Γ * , we denote by path(c, c ′ ) the set of transition sequences that transform configurations from c into c ′ .
Definition 4. Given a weighted pushdown system W = (P, S, f ) where P = (P, Γ, ∆, p 0 , ω 0 ), and regular sets of configurations S, T ⊆ P × Γ * , the meetover-all-path problem computes
We refer MOVP(S, T ) by MOVP(S, T, W) when there are more than one WPDS in the context. WDPSs are extended to Conditional WPDSs in [11] , by further associating each transition with regular languages that specify conditions over the stack under which a transition can be applied.
where P is a finite set of control locations, Γ is a finite stack alphabet, C is a finite set of regular languages over Γ , ∆ c ⊆ P × Γ × C × P × Γ * is a finite set of transitions, p 0 ∈ P is the initial control location, and γ 0 ∈ Γ is the initial stack
The reflecxive and transitive closure of ⇒ c is denoted by ⇒ * c .
Definition 6.
A conditional weighted pushdown system W c is a triplet (P c , S, f ), where P c = (P, Γ, C, ∆ c , p 0 , γ 0 ) is a conditional pushdown system, S = (D, ⊕, ⊗, 0, 1) is a bounded idempotent semiring, and f : ∆ c → D is a weight assignment function.
We lift the model checking problem on WPDSs in Definition 4 to Conditional WPDSs by replacing the underlying system from WPDSs to Conditional WPDSs, and refer it by MOVP as well.
Abstract Interpretation of Calling Contexts
We denote by M the set of methods in a program, and by L the set of program line numbers. Let CallSite ⊆ M × L denote the set of call sites, such that l contains a method call for any (m, l) ∈ CallSite. In sequel, we will always use ζ to range over CallSite.
where N ⊆ M is the set of nodes, E ⊆ M × CallSite × M is the set of edges, and s ∈ N is the initial node with no incoming edges. We write n → n ′ for (n, ζ, n ′ ) ∈ E, and → * is the transitive and reflexive closure of →. In particular, n check ∈ N and n priv ∈ N denote the method checkPermission and doPrivileged from the class AccessController, respectively.
The calling contexts of a method m, thereby local variables residing in the method, is the set of (possibly infinite) sequences of call sites leading to m from the program entry.
Definition 8 (Calling Contexts). By Context ⊆ CallSite
* we denote program calling contexts in terms of call site strings. Given a call graph G = (N, E, s), the calling contexts of a method m is defined by φ : M → 2
Context :
Given a finite set S = {s 0 , . . . , s k }, we denote by Π S the set of permutations of S. For a word ω = s i0 s i1 . . . s ij ∈ S * where 0 ≤ j ≤ k and 0 ≤ i j ≤ k, we define Σ(ω) = {s i0 , s i1 , . . . , s ij } to be the set of symbols that appear in ω.
Definition 9 (Abstract Calling Contexts). By AbsCtxt ⊆ 2
CallSite we denote the abstract program calling contexts as sets of call sites appearing along each call sequence.
-An abstraction function α : Context → AbsCtxt on calling contexts is defined by, for c ∈ Context, α(c) = Σ(c), and an abstraction functionα :
AbsCtxt on sets of calling contexts is defined by, for c ⊆ Context, α(c) = {Σ(ctxt) | ctxt ∈ c, and cs ′ / ∈α(c) if cs ′ ⊂ cs and cs ∈α(c)}
, and the powerset extension of γ is denoted
The abstract calling contexts of a method m is defined by a mapping φ meth : M → 2
AbsCtxt , such that φ meth (m) =α(φ(m)).
Let ≤ be a binary relation over Context such that ctxt ≤ ctxt
It is not hard to see that, for c ⊆ Context, cs ⊆ AbsCtxt,α(c) ⊆ cs iff c ≤γ(cs), and we can hereby conclude with Theorem 1.
As shown in this example, the design ofα concerns the situation of recursive calls.
The Analysis Framework
The overall structure of the analysis framework is shown in Figure 2 . It consists of analysis modules shown in rectangles. Context-sensitive string and points-to analysis, call graph construction and dependency graph construction are preassumed and defined in this section, and we discuss in Section 8 on how to adapt the off-the-shelf algorithms to fit the analysis framework. The generation of permissions and access control policies is given in the next sections. All analysis modules in Figure 2 are glued by means of a shared abstraction interpretation of program calling contexts given in Section 3. In the rest of the paper, we will use Example 1 as a running example in all examples.
Definition 10 (Context-Sensitive Points-to Analysis). Given a reference variable v of a method m, a context-sensitive points-to analysis, denoted by pta(v), (i) returns the finite set of abstract heap objects that v may refer to at runtime under certain calling contexts; and (ii) each object in pta(v) is represented as a triplet (T ype, loc, c), where T ype is its runtime type, loc is its allocation site, and c ∈ φ method (m) is the calling contexts under which the object is allocated.
Definition 11 (Context-Sensitive String Analysis). Given a string variable v of the method m, a context-sensitive string analysis, denoted by sa(v), (i) returns the finite set of string constants that v may contain at runtime under certain calling contexts; and (ii) each element in sa(v) is represented as a pair (sv, c), where sv is the string value and c ∈ φ meth (m) is the calling contexts under which sv is constructed.
Definition 12 (Context-Sensitive Call Graph). A context-sensitive call graph G cs = (G, φ edge ) consists of a call graph G = (N, E, s) and a mapping φ edge : E → 2 AbsCtxt , such that for each node n ∈ N , -φ edge (e) ⊆ φ meth (n) for each edge e = (n, ζ, n ′ ) ∈ E; -e=(n,ζ,n ′ )∈E φ edge (e) = φ meth (n).
We define a mapping φ route : (
In Java, due to dynamic dispatch, the target method of a dynamic dispatch depends on the runtime type of receiver objects. A precise call graph construction computes virtual call targets separately for each calling contexts, and yields a context-sensitive call graph. The calling contexts under which a call edge and a call path is feasible are characterised by φ edge and φ route in Def. 12, respectively. An algorithm for possibly constructing G cs is given in [11] .
Definition 13 (Dependency Graph). Given a program in SSA (Static Single Assignment) form. Let T perm denote the class (or type) Permission or any of its subclasses. Let L alloc ⊆ L be the set of program lines that allocate objects of T perm , and let AllocP erm ⊆ M × L alloc .
A dependency graph G dep of the program is a directed graph 
(5)
(11) (13) (12) (14) Fig. 3 . The Call Graph and Dependency Graph for Example 1 Example 3. The dependency graph and call graph of Example 1 is given in Figure 3 , where expr 1 abbreviates "new SocketPermission(hn,"connect")", and expr 2 abbreviates "new FilePermission(fn, "write")". Rectangles and dashed lines represent nodes and edges of dependency graph, respectively, and dotted lines represent edges from E inter specifically. Rectangles with shadow and solid lines represent nodes and edges of call graph, respectively. Dotted lines are used to group nodes of call graph and dependency graph if they correspond to the same method. Edges of both dependency graph and call graph are labelled with numbers. We also label call sites following the labels of edges, such that an edge (i) refers to (m, ζ (i) , m ′ ) for some m and m ′ . We show how to generate a context-sensitive call graph, i.e., φ edge , given points-to analysis. Since n check , n priv , checkConnect, and mkSocketP erm are static methods, these methods can be always called. The program entry point do not depend on previous calling contexts (that is empty) to dispatch a method invocation. Therefore we have φ edge ((i)) = ∅ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10} P riv.run() is dynamically dispatched from line 8, depending on the runtime type of object op. Given pta(op) = {(P riv, 7, {ζ (1) , ζ (3) }), (P riv, 7, {ζ (2) , ζ (4) })}, we have
Generating Permissions
All classes, hereby methods and program points, in a protection domain are granted the same set of permissions. All methods belonging to the system domain, e.g., the method AccessController.doPrivileged, are granted all permissions. Based on previously defined context-sensitive points-to and string analysis, we show in this section how permissions that are possibly involved in the given program are generated. The result is an over-approximation of exact permissions appearing at runtime given sound string and points-to analysis.
Definition 14 (Access Control Policy).
Let Domain denote the set of protection domains, and P erms denote the set of permissions. We denote by dom : M → Domain the mapping from methods to their protection domains, and perm : Domain → 2 P erms the mapping that grants permissions to protection domains. We define access control policy as a mapping policy : M → 2 P erms , such that policy = perm • dom.
By CheckP oint we denote call sites that directly call the method checkPermission, i.e., CheckP oint = {ζ ∈ CallSite | ∃n ∈ N : (n, ζ, n check ) ∈ E}. For Example 1, CheckP oint = {(checkConnect, 6), (checkAccess, 24)}.
Let φ perm : P erms → 2 AbsCtxt be a mapping from permissions to the program calling contexts under which permissions are generated. P erms and φ perm are generated as follows. Initially, P erms = ∅, and φ perm = λx.∅. For each call site (m, l) ∈ CheckP oint, l contains the expression "checkPermission(p)". For each (T ype, loc, c) ∈ pta(p), the heap allocation site referred to by loc contains expressions in one of the following form according to Java API specifications, where npv is reference variable of type T perm , target and action are string variables, and T ype ∈ T perm .    npv = new Type(target,action) (1) npv = new Type(target) (2) npv = new Type()
We augment P erms with a permission perm in the form of -"T ype(sv 1 , sv 2 )" if (sv 1 , c 1 ) ∈ sa(target), (sv 2 , c 2 ) ∈ sa(action), and c 1 = c 2 for case (1), and let φ perm (perm) = φ perm (perm) ∪ {c 1 }; -"Type(sv)" if (sv, c ′ ) ∈ sa(target) for case (2) , and let φ perm (perm) = φ perm (perm) ∪ {c ′ }; -"T ype" for case (3) , and let φ perm (perm) = φ perm (perm) ∪ φ method (m ′ ) where m ′ is the method that loc belongs to.
Example 4. Consider (checkConnect, 6) ∈ CheckP oint, we have φ meth (checkConnect) = {{ζ (1) , ζ (3) }, {ζ (2) , ζ (4) }} pta(p 1 ) = {(SocketP ermission, 12, c) | c ∈ φ meth (checkConnect)} Then consider the allocation site at line 12, we have sa(hn) = {("jaist.ac.jp/student : 8080", {ζ (2) , ζ (4) , ζ (5) })} ∪ {("jaist.ac.jp/f aculty : 8080", {ζ (1) , ζ (3) , ζ (5) })} sa("connect") = {("connect", {ζ (1) , ζ (3) , ζ (5) }), ("connect", {ζ (2) , ζ (4) , ζ (5) })} The following permissions can be generated "perm s : SocketP ermission("jaist.ac.jp/student : 8080", "connect")" with φ perm (perm s ) = {{ζ (2) , ζ (4) , ζ (5) }}, and "perm f : SocketP ermission("jaist.ac.jp/f aculty : 8080", "connect")" with φ perm (perm f ) = {{ζ (1) , ζ (3) , ζ (5) }} Consider another check point (checkAccess, 24) ∈ CheckP oint, we can similarly generate permissions "perm a : F ileP ermission("C : /log.txt", "write") with φ perm (perm a ) = {{ζ (1) , ζ (3) , ζ (7) , ζ (8) }, {ζ (2) , ζ (4) , ζ (7) , ζ (8) }}
Problem Formalization
In this section, we fix a context-sensitive call graph G cs = (G, φ edge ) where G = (N, E, s), and a dependency graph G dep = (N dep , E dep , S dep ).
Definition 15 (Valid Call Paths). We define
-the set of call paths from s to a node n ∈ N by path(n) = {e 0 e 1 . . . e k | ∃k ∈ N : n 0 = s, n k+1 = n,
-the set of call paths from s to n that are truncated by the node n priv as tpath(n) = {e 0 e 1 e 2 . . . e k | ∃k ∈ N : n 0 = s, n k+1 = n, n 0 → * n priv ,
-the set of valid call paths from s to a node n ∈ N by vpath(n) = {σ ∈ tpath(n) ∪ path(n) | ∃c ∈ φ route (σ) : c ⊆ sites(σ) and σ / ∈ vpath(n) if σ ′ ∈ tpath(n) and σ ′ is a suffix of σ} where sites(σ) = {ζ 0 , . . . , ζ k } for a call path σ = e 0 e 1 . . . e k with e i = (n i , ζ i , n i+1 ) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k.
Example 5. Figure 3 consists of the following valid call paths from s to n check : (1)(3)(6), (2)(4)(6), and ( (8)(9)(10).
Definition 16 (Dependency Paths).
We define the set of dependency paths from S dep to a node n ∈ N dep by dpath(n) = {e 0 e 1 . . . e k | ∃k ∈ N : n 0 ∈ S dep , n k+1 = n,
and for each dependency path π,
where for each edge e = ((m, l),
For a valid call path σ = e 0 e 1 . . . e k with e i = (n i , ζ i , n i+1 ) for each 0
Definition 17 (Relate Valid Call Paths to Permissions). Given a dependency path π = e 0 e 1 · · · e k , where 
, and let w r = extract(π). We say π matches with σ if ω l ω r is a well-matched word (every symbol ] (m,l) has a matched symbol [ (m,l) before it in the word). The set of all valid call paths that π matches with is denoted by match(π).
Given a valid call path σ ∈ vpath(n check ) and a permission perm ∈ P erms. We say σ relates to perm if there exists a dependency path π ∈ dpath(n) for some n ∈ CheckP oint, and (i) there exists a valid call path σ ′ ∈ match(π) such that meths(σ) ⊆ meths(π)∪ meths(σ ′ ) ∪ {n check }; and (ii) there exists c ∈ φ perm (perm) such that c ⊆ sites(σ ′ ).
In Def. 17, π matches with σ means that π and σ jointly constitute a valid inter-procedural data and control flow with respect to the permission allocated at the initial node of π. By valid, we mean as usual that methods returns are matched by method calls. Furthermore, if any calling context (i.e., the set of call sites) for allocating a permission is consumed in σ matched with π, we regard that π relates to the permission. We regard a valid call path σ ′ relates to a permission if the set of methods visited by σ ′ is consumed in the valid inter-procedural data and control flow with respect to that permission.
Definition 18 (Policy Generation). We define policy : M → 2 P erms by, for each valid call path σ ∈ vpath(n check ), a permission perm ∈ P erm, and m ∈ meths(σ), perm ∈ policy(m) if σ relates to perm.
Example 6. Consider the valid call path σ : (1)(3)(6) ∈ vpath(n check ). For the dependency path π : (11)(12)(13) ) [ ζ (4) [ ζ (5) for σ ′ , and ω r =] ζ (5) for π). We have meths(π) = {mkSocketP erm, checkConnect} meths(σ ′ ) = {s, connectF aculty, checkConnect, mkSocketP erm} meths(σ) = {s, connectF aculty, checkConnect, n check } and therefore meths(σ) ⊆ meths(σ ′ ) ∪ meths(π) ∪ {n check }. Furthermore, by Example 4, we have φ perm f ⊆ sites(σ ′ ) = {ζ (1) , ζ (3) , ζ (5) }. By Definition 17 and 18, each method of meths(σ) holds perm f . In this way we can precisely infer that φ perm (connectF actulty) = perm f , φ perm (connectStudent) = {perm s }.
Generating Access Control Policy
Definition 19 (Modeling Context-Sensitive Call Graph). Given a contextsensitive call graph G cs = (G, φ edge ) where G = (N, E, s). We define a conditional pushdown system P c = ({·}, Γ, C, ∆ c , {·}, s), where -the set of control locations is a singleton {·}; -the stack alphabet Γ ⊆ M ∪ CallSite;
-we write α C ֒→ ω for (·, α, C, ·, ω) ∈ ∆ c . ∆ c is constructed as follows, for each edge e = (m, ζ, m ′ ) ∈ E, we have
In Def. 19, C(e) means that some calling context of the call edge in question is contained in the current call stack.
Definition 20 (Modeling Dependency Graph). Give a dependency graph
c is constructed as follows, for each edge e = (n, n ′ ) ∈ E dep where n = (m, l) and
Definition 21 (Program Modeling). We define a conditional pushdown system P prog = ({·}, Γ, C prog , ∆ prog , {·}, s) where, C prog = C ∪ C ′ , and ∆ prog = ∆ c ∪ ∆ ′ c , by combining P c and P ′ c generated for G cs and G dep , respectively.
Definition 22 (Weight Domain). We define a bounded idempontent semiring
CallSite ∪ {0}, and 1 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)}; and for any d, d
One can prove that both ⊗ m and ⊕ m are associative, and ⊕ m is commutative and distributive over ⊗ m , which holds for a bounded idempontent semiring.
Definition 23 (Modeling Policy Generation). We define a conditional weighted pushdown system W gen = (P prog , S gen , f gen ). For each transition rule δ ∈ ∆ gen , f gen (δ) is defined as follows,
Definition 24 (Algorithm for Generating Access Control Policy). Given a conditional weighted pushdown system W gen = (P prog , S gen , f gen ) constructed by Def. 23. We compute
∈ result, and perm ∈ P erms, we say perm is required by
For each d computed in Def. 24, M 4 is the calling history in terms of call sites of valid inter-procedural data flows constituted by call paths and dependency paths; M 1 contains methods that reside on call paths truncated by n priv ; M 2 is supposed to be ∅ by our modeling, because n priv can never be the initial node of call graph, and M 3 contains finished called methods that do not reside on the current call stack. Therefore M 1 \ M 3 contains methods residing on the current call stack before a privileged method. The algorithm for generating access control policy precisely corresponds to principles in Def. 17. The soundness of our analysis is straightforward given the abstract interpretation in Section 3.
Example 7. By Def. 19, we have
By Def. 20, we have
that is encoded from the edge (12) of dependency graph, where C = Γ * . We have the following weights for transitions,
where
We have that perm f is required by d 1 , perm s is required by d 2 , and perm a is required by d 3 and d 4 . We can further infer permissions possessed by each method by (ii) of Def. 24.
Discussions

Context-Sensitive Points-to and String Analysis
Context-sensitive points-to and string analysis play a crucial role in our analysis framework. It is not hard to adapt the existing analysis to fit our needs.
It is direct to adapt static analysis by WPDSs to our setting, because WPDSs have the advantage of handling data flow queries as regular languages of pushdown configurations, and regular stack configurations naturally encode our abstraction of calling contexts. For instance, for each reference variable v of the method m, we can compute pta(v) = Tctxt MOVP(S, T ctxt ) where S is the source configurations, and T ctxt = { v, mω | Σ(ω) ⊆ ctxt} for each ctxt ∈ φ method (m).
To adapt cloning-based analysis to our needs, we can turn to the following approach that is line with context-cloning: given a call graph G = (N, E, s) (or graphs which product with call graph as the starting point of the analysis). We construct another graph G clone = (N clone , E clone ), where N clone ⊆ 2 AbsCtxt × N is the set of nodes, E clone ⊆ N clone × CallSite × N clone is the set of edges, and we have (i) (c, n) ∈ N clone for c ∈ φ method (n), and n ∈ N ; and (ii) ((c, n), (c ′ , n ′ )) ∈ E clone if c ⊆ c ′ and (n, n ′ ) ∈ E for (c, n), (c ′ , n ′ ) ∈ N clone . One obtains context-sensitive analysis by applying context-insensitive analysis to G clone , e.g., the points-to analysor Spark [10] can be adapted by cloning its points-to graph in this manner, and string analysor JSA (Java String Analyzer) [5] can be lifted to a context-sensitive analysis of our framework by cloning its front-end flow graph, with no need to modify the back-end analysis engine.
Policy Checking
Another popular need in access rights analysis is checking whether the program function properly given an access control policy, e.g., codes from trusted domains always pass access control or may fail. The answer can either help detect redundant inspection points or refine the given policies.
One approach to policy checking is first generating an access control policy as described before, and then check whether the given policy consumes the required policy. Formally, given a policy : M → 2 P erms and a policy ′ : M → 2 P erms generated by Def.18. Stack inspection triggered in the program always succeed if policy ′ (m) ⊆ policy(m) for each m ∈ M, and may fail otherwise. However, one problem for this approach is that, we may reject a benign security policy if it is more precise than the generated one. After all, the access control policy automatically generated is an over-approximation of the minimal policy by sound static analysis.
Instead of generating the minimal policy in advance, an alternative is to check on-demand at stack inspection points whether all methods in the current call stack are granted required permissions. The two approaches to policy checking are in line with the two ways of implementing stack inspection mechanism by virtual machines in an either eager or lazy manner.
Related Work
From the theoretical aspect, Banerjee et al. in [1] gived a denotational semantics and hereby proved the equivalence of eager and lazy evaluation for stack inspection. They further proposed a static analysis of safety property, and also identified program transformations that help remove redundant runtime access control checks. The problem to decide whether a program satisfies a given policy properties via stack inspection, was proved intractable in general by Nitta et al. in [12] . They showed that there exists a solvable subclass of programs which precisely model programs containing checkPermission of Java 2 platform. Moreover, the study concluded the computational complexity of the problem for the subclass is linear time in the size of the given program.
Chang et al. [4] provided a backward static analysis to approximate redundant permission checks with must-fail stack inspection and success permission checks with must-pass stack inspection. This approach was later employed in a visualization tool of permission checks in Java [8] . But the tool didn't provide any means to relieve users from the burden of deciding access rights. In addition to a policy file, users were also required to explicitly specify which methods and permissions to check. Two control flow forward analysis, Denied Permission Analysis and Granted Permission Analysis, were defined by Bartoletti et al. [2] [3] to approximate the set of permissions denied or granted to a given Java bytecode at runtime. Outcome of the analysis were then used to eliminate redundant permission checks and relocate others to more proper places in the code.
Koved et al. in [9] proposed a context-sensitive, flow-sensitive, and contextsensitive (1-CFA) data flow analysis to automatically estimate the set of access rights required at each program point. In spite of notable experimental results, the study suffered from a practical matter, as it does not properly handle strings in the analysis. Being a module of privilege assertion in a popular tool -IBM Security Workbench Development for Java (SWORD4J) [7] , the interprocedural analysis for privileged code placement [14] tackled three neat problems: identifying portions of codes that necessary to make privileged, detecting tainted variables in privileged codes, and exposing useless privileged blocks of codes, by utilizing the technique in [9] .
In aforementioned works, they all assume permissions required at every checkPermission(perm) point. That is, they either ignored or employed limited computation of String parameters. Correspondingly, the access rights analysis become too conservative, e.g., many false alarms may be produced in policy checking.
To the best of our knowledge, the modular permission analysis proposed in [6] is the most relevant to our work . On one hand, it was also concerned with automatically generating security polices for any given program, with particular attention on the principle of least privilege. On the other hand, they were the first to attempt to reflect the effects of string analysis in access rights analysis in terms of slicing. A modular analysis algorithm is proposed to achieve the practical scalability, and the authors developed a tool Automated Authorization Analysis (A3) to assess the precision of permission requirements for stack inspection. However, their algorithms are based on a context-insensitive call graph and the analysis results can be polluted by invalid call paths. Moreover, their slicing algorithms are also context-insensitive.
Conclusions
We have presented a systematic approach to automated generation of access control policies for a given Java program. The techniques are abstract interpretation based context-sensitive static program analysis. We define an abstract interpretation on program calling contexts, and all analysis modules required in access rights analysis are hereby glued together in an unified analysis framework. Given such an abstract interpretation, we generate permissions that are possibly involved in access rights analysis. In our analysis, the program is modelled by combining a context-sensitive call graph with a dependency graph of the target program and we are therefore able to precisely identify permission requirements at checkpoints of stack inspection. We expect a good precision of our analysis due to its context-sensitive nature. A public tool that can automatically generating security policies for Java applications doesn't exist so far. It would be interesting to put the analysis techniques proposed in the paper into practice by settling scalability. As the first step, we are implementing an efficient model checking algorithm for Conditional WPDSs, tailored for algorithms presented in the paper. Although stack inspection is widely adopted as a simple and practical model in stack-based access control, it has a number of inherent flaws, e.g., an unauthorized code which is no longer in the call stack may be allowed to affect the execution of security-sensitive code. A worth highlighting alternate model is
